Joint Degeneration and Age Discrimination
Welcome back from the weekend, my dear readers. It was a good to see you all attend the funeral pyre of California’s MPN, but one can only hope our next meeting will be under happier circumstances.
Today, your humble blogger brings you a different case, William Slagle v. Department of Corrections California Men’s Colony. Applicant, a 65-year-old dental lab technician instructor, was evaluated by an Agreed Medical Evaluator for various injuries to various body parts, among them his right knee. The AME found that 80% of the damage sustained by applicant’s knee was caused by his industrial injury, but 20% was caused by non-industrial degenerative changes.
During his deposition, the AME said “the degenerative findings in [applicant’s] knee are related to the fact that he’s 64 years old. I don’t think it is unremarkable for a 64-year-old person to have some degenerative changes in their knee.”
Applicant’s counsel seized upon this to claim that the award, based on the AME’s opinions, constitutes illegal age-discrimination in violation of Government Code section 11135. Needless to say, the WCJ was not impressed, and neither was the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board. The fact that applicant’s age makes the degeneration of his knees “unremarkable” is not age discrimination.
The Court of Appeal likewise denied applicant’s petition for a writ of review.
But, as a defense attorney, I can’t help but think about the other side of the coin. Let’s say a 35 year-old applicant sustains the same type of injury and the Agreed Medical Evaluator notices some sort of degeneration on his knee. The AME then concludes that it is “remarkable” to find that sort of degeneration on a person of that age, so the damage must be industrial.
In the Slagle case, the AME noted that the degeneration found just three months after the date of injury appeared to have been present since before the date of injury. In the case of a 35 year-old, perhaps it would be appropriate to ask the same question: is it possible that this much degeneration would have occurred only since the date of injury?
Different Strokes for Different Folks
In as much as you adore your humble blogger, one can only hope that you will forgive the pun in today’s blog post title.
Applicant suffered a stroke while working as a journeyman screen printer in the case of Francisco Amaya v. California Printed. Mr. Amaya was given the job of printing thirty six flags and a deadline of 1:00p.m. The trial evidence differed on whether he was assigned this task at 8:00 a.m., allowing for five hours, or at 9:30 a.m., allowing for three and a half hours. In any case, because of the “stressful working condition” of having to make so many flags to print in so little time, applicant suffered a stroke. Also contributing to the stroke was the fact that he had stepped on a spray can, causing him to fall to the ground. Sounds pretty bad, no?
Well, some facts might clear this up. Applicant suffered his stroke a little before 11:00 a.m., and at that time had completed six of his assigned thirty six flags. So, that means that he had between 1.5 and three hours to print the six flags, leaving another 30 to be completed by 1:00 in the afternoon. How many flags could YOU print in that short a time period? 10? 20? Well, if you’re one of applicant’s co-workers, it would probably take you thirty minutes, which is what it took another employee who was assigned the remainder of Mr. Amaya’s workload. Not so much of a “high pressure” situation any more, is it?
Also, what may have contributed to the stroke was the non-industrial and untreated “hypertension, hypercholesterolemia, and diabetes” which applicant had at the time of the stroke.
So, here is what the panel QME did with this case:
1) He ordered a CT scan of applicant’s head, because head trauma “could have been a precipitating or enhancing factor.” Without having seen the CT scan results, eh concluded that applicant’s stroke was caused by 25% industrial factors and 75% non-industrial factors. When he later saw that the CT scan showed no head trauma, he declined to change his opinion.
2) He also found that his stroke could have been a reaction to stepping on a spray can, but if he did not step on the spray can, the PQME would not change his opinion.
Here is how your skeptical blogger reads these facts: “well, I’m not going to let these facts let this guy walk away from this thing empty-handed.”
The defense argued that the PQME’s opinions do not constitute substantial medical evidence – this lunacy of a medical opinion does not justify its findings and seems unmoved by any shifting facts. So, what do you think the Workers’ Compensation Judge did with this?
The WCJ threw it out of her courtroom! She found that the PQME “did not explain the bases for his opinion that Applicant’s work activities … constituted 20-25% of the causation of the stroke, irrespective of the pace at which Mr. Amaya was required to work.” The injury was ruled non-compensable, and applicant’s request to take a second bite at the apple further develop the record was denied as the PQME “has been given ample opportunity, through the deposition process, to provide support for his opinions… [he] has not provided the necessary support, and … further discovery such as another deposition is not likely to yield a properly supported opinion.”
The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board denied applicant’s petition for reconsideration and incorporated the WCJ’s report.
Curious about this Northern California PQME who hands out causation like it’s candy? Please shoot me an e-mail for the panel opinion: gregory@grinberglawoffice.com
Permanent Total Disability for Non-Industrial Causes
California Labor Code section 4662 allows for a presumption of total permanent disability in cases of the loss of sight in both eyes, loss of use of both hands, practically total paralysis, and brain injuries resulting in mental incapacity or insanity. Otherwise, “permanent total disability shall be determined in accordance with the fact.”
Originally part of the labor code since 1917, section 4662 was meant to provide for those completely devastating cases, where the employee reached permanent total disability in the course of service to the employer. However, applicant’s attorneys have a more “equitable” use for this section.
In the case of Jesus Cordova v. Garaventa Enterprises (2011 panel decision), applicant sustained an injury to the cervical spine, lumbar spine, and left upper extremity when he fell off a tractor, yet held onto the steering wheel, causing his torso to twist. The Workers’ Compensation Judge awarded applicant 100% PD, reasoning that his medically imposed physical restrictions, combined with the opinions of applicant’s vocational rehabilitation expert, rendered him completely unemployable.
Defendant naturally argued that applicant’s failure to learn to speak English (dare your humble blogger point out applicant’s 15 years of working in the United States?) and the applicant’s lack of success in adult education courses were not its fault. (In fact, if “[a]pportionment of permanent disability shall be based on causation,” as Labor Code section 4663 commands, shouldn’t permanent total disability be apportioned as well?)
The WCJ, however, saw it differently:
“we all come to the job market with innate limitations. It is axiomatic that there will always be certain jobs, given one’s level of intelligence, talents, education, characterological disposition, and innate body strengths and habitus that he or she will never be qualified for. It would be inequitable to factor these into the equation, in determining whether a worker who has sustained a significant injury is totally disabled. If we were to do so, no injured worker could ever receive an award of permanent total disability, regardless of how catastrophic his industrial injury might be.”
The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board affirmed the WCJ’s decision.
Your humble blogger will point out, at this point, that there is a (sadly and regrettably) de-published, and therefore un-citable case, Hertz Corporation v. Workers Compensation Appeals Board (Aguilar), in which the Court of Appeal found, that “[t]he finding of vocational nonfeasibility was based in part on preexisting, nonindustrial factors, that is, Aguilar’s inability to read and write English. Therefore … Herz is not liable for that portion of Aguilar’s permanent disability that is caused by preexisting nonindustrial factors.”
The WCJ’s opinion in this case is a dangerous one – applicant began working with a very limited scope of possible employment, and he was deprived of only a limited scope of employment by an industrial injury.
To suggest that the employer (or insurer) is liable for depriving applicant of a full spectrum of possible jobs, when applicant’s own decision not to learn English or his non-industrial inability to develop other job skills, had previously barred him from anything other than heavy physical labor, flies in the face of Labor Code section 4663.
In any case, efforts to have Aguilar published were met with disapproval by the California Supreme Court (See 2010 Cal. Lexis 7175 – petition for publication denied). We can expect that future efforts to recognize as non-industrial such limitations as Messrs. Aguilar and Cordova brought to their employment will likewise be met with stiff resistance by the WCAB.